[中图分类号]F842[文献标识码]A[文章编号]1004-3306(2023)09-0032-15 DOI:10.13497/j.cnki.is.2023.09.003
资源价格:30积分
[摘 要]行政处罚是保险业市场行为监管的重要手段,对于防范和化解保险公司风险具有重要意义。本文基于手工搜集的2010~2021年保险公司行政处罚数据,从处罚次数、处罚金额、重大行政处罚等维度考察了行政处罚对保险公司风险防范的影响,并深入讨论了其作用机理及异质性效果。研究发现:行政处罚能够显著抑制保险公司风险,促进保险公司稳健经营;重大行政处罚的风险抑制作用更强,并且这一抑制作用具有长期性;市场竞争程度能够增强行政处罚对保险公司风险的抑制效果。进一步研究表明,行政处罚对保险公司的风险抑制作用在财产险公司、非国有保险公司和低盈利能力保险公司中更加显著。本文的研究结论对于丰富保险监管的内涵,防范金融风险具有重要的现实意义。
[关键词]行为监管;行政处罚;保险公司;风险防范
[作者简介]李秀芳,南开大学金融学院教授、博士生导师;张强(通讯作者),南开大学金融学院博士研究生。
Behavioral Regulation and Risk Prevention in Insurance Companies: Evidences from Administrative Penalty Big Data
LI Xiu-fang,ZHANG Qiang
Abstract:Administrative penalties are an important means for regulating the insurance market and are of significant importance in preventing and mitigating risks for insurance companies.Based on manually collected administrative penalty data from insurance companies from 2010 to 2021,this paper examines the impact of administrative penalties on risk prevention for insurance companies from various dimensions such as the number of penalties,penalty amounts,and major administrative penalties.The article also delves into the mechanisms and heterogeneous effects of these penalties.The research findings indicate that administrative penalties can significantly suppress risks for insurance companies and promote their stable operations.Major administrative penalties have a stronger risk-reducing effect,and this effect persists in the long term.Additionally,the degree of market competition enhances the risk-reducing effect of administrative penalties on insurance companies.Further research suggests that the risk-reducing effect of administrative penalties is more pronounced in property insurance companies,non-state-owned insurance companies and insurers with a lower profit-making capability.The conclusions of this study have important practical implications for enriching insurance regulations and preventing financial risks.
Key words:behavioral regulation; administrative penalties; insurance companies; risk prevention
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